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There has been much recent attention given to the problems involved with the
traditional approach to null hypothesis significance testing (NHST). Many have
suggested that, perhaps, NHST should be abandoned altogether in favor of other
bases for conclusions such as confidence intervals and effect size estimates (e.g.,
Schmidt, 1996). The purposes of this article are to (a) review the function that data
analysis is supposed to serve in the social sciences, (b) examine the ways in which
these functions are performed by NHST, (c) examine the case against NHST, and
(d) evaluate interval-based estimation as an alternative to NHST.
The topic of this article is null hypothesis signifi-
cance testing (NHST; Cohen, 1994). By this we mean
the process, common to the behavioral sciences, of
rejecting or suspending judgment on a given null hy-
pothesis based on a priori theoretical considerations
and p values in an attempt to draw conclusions with
respect to an alternative hypothesis. We should begin
by saying that we agree with J. Cohen, G. Gigerenzer,
D. Bakan, W. Rozeboom, and so on with respect to
the notion that the logic of NHST is widely misun-
derstood and that the conclusions drawn from such
tests are often unfounded or at least exaggerated
(Bakan, 1966; Cohen, 1990, 1994; Gigerenzer, 1993;
Rozeboom, 1960). Nevertheless, we think it important
that the extent and likely direction of such problems
be carefully examined, because NHST, when used
and interpreted properly, is useful for certain purposes
and is only partially problematic for others.
This article is divided into three parts. The first part
is devoted to an examination of the role played by
data analysis in the social sciences and the extent to
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which NHST supports this role. The second part
presents and critiques the case against NHST as an
analytic tool. The third part investigates the viability
of confidence intervals as an alternative to NHST.
Purpose of Data Analysis
Perhaps the best way to begin is to consider the
rationale of the typical research project in the social
sciences and the role played by data analysis in the
structure of the project. Every research project begins
with a research question. Let us assume that the ques-
tion has to do with a bivariate relationship that has
never been examined empirically before. The first
step in the project typically involves the generation of
a theoretically based answer to the question, that is, a
hypothesis. This hypothesis is often based on a com-
bination of reason and previous empirical work in
related areas and gives us evidence of a certain kind
for a particular answer to the research question. This
form of evidence is invaluable, but scientific tradition
holds that corroboration, whether in the form of fal-
sification or justification, is desirable (Lakatos, 1978;
Popper, 1959; Serlin & Lapsley, 1985). If that cor-
roboration is independent of the theoretical basis for
the initial answer to the research question, then the
corroboration is all the more impressive. This inde-
pendent corroboration often takes the form of empiri-
cal data and allows us to attack the research question
from directions that are largely orthogonal to one an-
other.
The stronger the theoretical basis for the initial an-
swer, the less reliance one need put on the data. For
example, it is said that Albert Einstein had no interest
in empirical tests of his theory of relativity. The
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theory was so strong that any competently collected
empirical evidence would support the theory. Thus,
the empirical evidence was largely superfluous.
On the other hand, we in the social sciences are
rarely if ever justified in placing so much confidence
in theoretical answers. Nevertheless, we can certainly
think of such hypotheses as lying on a continuum of
supportability that ranges from weak to strong. If mul-
tiple, well-respected theoretical perspectives suggest
the same hypothesis, then the theoretical support for
that position is strong, and one is less reliant on the
data. If, on the other hand, the theoretical support for
a given position is weak, then the burden of proof
shifts to the data.
Let us assume for the moment that the theoretical
basis for a given hypothesis is of average strength. Let
us assume further that the experiment designed to
provide corroboration for this hypothesis involves
sound measures, reasonable procedures, and so on,
and that data are collected within this design. The
Neyman-Pearson framework on which much of mod-
ern significance testing is based suggests that the de-
sired outcome of data analysis is the adjustment of our
confidence in our hypotheses so that we can behave as
if a given hypothesis is true or false until further evi-
dence is amassed (Neyman & Pearson, 1928, 1933).
But the question remains, how does one decide
whether and the extent to which the data allow us to
increase our confidence in the theoretically based an-
swer to the research question?
Let us consider for a moment what it is that we
have to work with in the social sciences, particularly
in comparison with the physical sciences. Largely be-
cause of the complexity of the variables studied in the
social sciences, our theories are not powerful enough
to generate point hypotheses. Physical scientists often
scoff at our attempts to make general statements of the
form "A increases B" without specifying the precise
degree to which A increases B. The example of 32
ft./s/s has been used in arguing that we need to focus
on parameter estimation (e.g., regression weights) in-
stead of saying things such as "Gravity makes things
fall." Although we agree with this sentiment in prin-
ciple, it strikes us as being a bit naive when applied to
the study of human behavior. The constraints placed
on population values by theory are much weaker in
the social sciences than they are in the physical sci-
ences (Serlin & Lapsley, 1985). The example of 32
ft./s/s is a more or less immutable law of nature (on
Earth of course). It is always true, so it makes sense to
apply a specific number to it. What happens if we
change the question a bit? Suppose we wish to know
the rate at which stock prices drop after interest rates
are raised. In some cases, a given increase in interest
rates produces a precipitous drop; in other cases the
same increase produces little or no drop. We can com-
pute an average and use this to draw some general
conclusions, but it would be difficult to predict the
drop rate in any given instance with a great deal of
accuracy. The point is that the vagaries of the stock
market and other such phenomena are created by hu-
man decisions and behavior. There is often too much
complexity in such situations and perhaps too much
variability in people for a theoretically based point
parameter estimate to make much sense. We suggest
that there are many situations in which we are better
off sticking to more conservative, general predictions
(and conclusions) such as A increases B.
Regardless of the form of the hypothesis, it must be
exclusionary in order to make a contribution. This
usually, though by no means necessarily, takes the
form of a dichotomous prediction of some kind. For
example, the hypotheses "A affects B" and "The
95% confidence interval will not contain zero" are
dichotomous and exclusionary in the sense that A
either affects B or does not, or the interval contains
zero or not, and our hypotheses exclude the alterna-
tive possibilities. Empirical evidence is then gathered
and evaluated in terms of the extent to which we can
adjust our confidence in the relevant hypotheses. In
other words, we use empirical corroboration (or lack
thereof) to adjust a degree of rational belief (Keynes,
1921). Where it is necessary to make a decision based
on these levels of confidence, we then behave as if the
null were true or we behave as if the alternative were
true. This behavior can take the form of policy
change, as is often the case in the applied social sci-
ences, or it can represent one step in a series of steps
associated with the test of a theory (e.g., path analysis
or measurement development). As always, it be-
hooves us to keep in mind that the underlying basis
for the decision is continuous.
What is required of empirical corroboration?
There are at least three interrelated requirements for
empirical corroboration: (a) objectivity, (b) exclusion
of alternative hypotheses (e.g., a hypothesis of a re-
lationship with a different sign or an alternative struc-
tural model), and (c) exclusion of alternative expla-
nations (e.g., confounds or sampling error). It can be
shown that proper experimental design followed by
significance testing allows one to address all three of
these requirements. No analysis procedure, including
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significance testing, can meet these requirements per-
fectly, but significance testing, for a variety of rea-
sons, addresses these critical issues as well as or better
than do the alternatives for many types of research
questions. Before discussing these three requirements,
however, let us take a moment to consider the reason
that corroboration itself is critical.
In the perfect world, perhaps every piece of re-
search would be published somewhere. In a slightly
less perfect world, any study with compelling theory
and an adequate method would be published some-
where. Given limited journal space, however, we are
forced to choose from among submissions those ar-
ticles that advance knowledge with the greatest effi-
ciency. The article that provides a certain theoretical
answer to a question, but also presents data that sug-
gest a different answer, does advance knowledge.
However, all else being equal, it does not advance
knowledge as far as does the article with theoretical
and empirical answers that are in agreement. The first
type informs us that either the theory is wrong or the
method is flawed. Thus, we are unable to adjust our
confidence in any particular answer to the relevant
research question. The second type, by contrast, al-
lows us to increase our confidence in a given answer
by virtue of the independent sources suggesting that
answer. Given that corroboration is important, signifi-
cance testing is useful because it gives us a mecha-
nism for adjusting our confidence in certain answers.
This can be shown hi the context of the three require-
ments for corroboration mentioned above.
One of the most critical requirements of corrobo-
ration is objectivity. The desire for objective verifica-
tion can be traced at least as far back as Kant's (1781)
Critique of Pure Reason and his references to inter-
subjectivity, but the modern notions of objectivity and
value freedom in the social sciences appear to stem
from M. Weber (Miller, 1979). Empirical corrobora-
tion should be objective in the sense that it should be
as independent of the theoretically based answer to
the research question as is possible (Dellow, 1970;
Miller, 1987). In this way, it can complement entirely
the theoretical evidence. While perfect objectivity
may not be possible (Kuhn, 1962; Lakatos, 1978), it is
important that we strive for separation of theoretical
and empirical evidence.
It is largely because of this need to separate theo-
retical from empirical evidence that Bayesian statis-
tics, with its reliance on arbitrary prior probabilities,
has been used seldom to test scientific hypotheses
(Putnam, 1981). Instead, we ask that theoretical an-
swers, which are typically developed by the re-
searcher that asked the research question and are
therefore susceptible to intrasubjectivity, be separated
as much as possible from those empirical answers. In
proper significance testing with adequate levels of
power, we compare observed results with a priori cut-
offs to decide whether or not we will adjust our con-
fidence in the hypothesis at hand. These cutoffs are
somewhat arbitrary, but they are also intersubjective
in the sense that they are conventional, and they are
chosen before the data are examined. Thus, while it
can be argued that the choice of cutoff is somewhat
whimsical, it is largely the whim of others (as op-
posed to the experimenter at hand) that determines the
cutoff, and whatever impact the whim of the experi-
menter has on the choice of cutoff, this impact takes
place prior to examination of data. This allows one to
meet the Popperian requirement that the conditions
necessary for the drawing of certain conclusions are
determined beforehand, ceteris paribus clauses not-
withstanding (Serlin & Lapsley, 1985). Of course, ob-
served probability values should be reported so that
the reader can draw his or her own conclusions, but
the conclusions of the experimenter are to be based on
predetermined criteria.
A second demand of empirical corroboration is that
it allows us to rule out alternative hypotheses. If our
prediction is that "A has a positive effect on B," then
it is desirable that our data allow us to assess the
plausibility of alternative hypotheses such as "A has
a negative effect on B" or "A has a negligible effect
on B." In this way, we can show that our theory
explains phenomena to a greater extent than do alter-
natives (Lakatos, 1978). Significance testing allows
the comparison of theoretical hypotheses to a null
hypothesis. The term null has typically been used to
represent the hypothesis that is to be nullified (Cohen,
1994). This null hypothesis can be that there is no
effect or no relationship, but this need not be the case.
Regardless of the form of the null, significance testing
involves a comparison of hypothetical distributions;
specifically, it involves the comparison of the sam-
pling distribution associated with the observed result
to the distribution associated with the null. If it is
highly unlikely that the null distribution would have
produced the observed result, and if this discrepancy
is in the anticipated direction, then we adjust our con-
fidences such that we tentatively rule out the null
hypothesis (as well as distributions that are even less
probable than the null) in favor of the theoretically
based hypothesis.
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A third demand of empirical corroboration is that it
be subject to as few alternative explanations as pos-
sible. Thus, we hope to be able to point to our data and
claim not only that it is as one would expect given the
theory, but also that its alignment with the theory is
not due to extraneous factors. If one accepts the ap-
proach of John Stuart Mill (1872), then there are three
criteria for the inference of cause: temporal prece-
dence, covariation, and the elimination of alternative
explanations for the covariation. The first two present
relatively few problems. It is the problem of alterna-
tive explanations that gives us the most trouble. For
any given instance of covariation, there are likely to
be a multitude of possible alternative explanations
such as the impact of unmeasured variables, the
choice of sample, and so on. One potential alternative
source of covariation that has received a great deal of
attention in recent years is sampling error.1 The p
value in NHST gives the probability that the data
would have occurred given the truth of the null hy-
pothesis (Carver, 1978). In other words, p is the prob-
ability that the departure of the test result from null
would have resulted from sampling error alone.2 Al-
though our cutoffs (.05 and .01 typically) are arbi-
trary, they allow us to evaluate the extent to which
sampling error is a viable alternative explanation. If
our p value is less than the preset cutoff, then we can
be reasonably confident (assuming all else is in order)
that sampling error was not the reason that our test
statistic differed from our null value. Thus, we have
moved toward satisfying the third of Mill's criteria for
inferring causality. We have effectively ruled out
sampling error as an alternative explanation for the
departure of our test result from null.
In summary, the purpose of data analysis is to pro-
vide corroboration (or fail to provide corroboration)
of theoretical answers to research questions. This cor-
roboration is most convincing when it is intersubjec-
tive and disconfirming of alternative hypotheses and
explanations. We clearly show that NHST does in fact
provide a form of corroboration that contains each of
these elements.
Case Against NHST
The case against NHST has taken various forms.
The most common attack of recent years has involved
pointing out the interpretational problems associated
with NHST when conducted in the presence of meth-
odological flaws (e.g., small samples; Schmidt, 1996)
and experimenter ignorance (e.g., interpretation of
conditional probabilities of empirical results as con-
ditional probabilities of hypotheses; Cohen, 1994).
There can be no doubt that the presence of method-
ological flaws in a study limits the conclusions that
can be drawn from NHST. Of course, such flaws limit
the conclusions that can be drawn from any proce-
dure, so we see no point in holding NHST or any
other procedure accountable for the shortcomings of
the data to which they are applied.
On the other hand, we would like to address what
we consider to be the most glaring problems associ-
ated with the criticisms involving experimenter igno-
rance. The criticisms are that (a) many experimenters
commit the error of interpreting the conditional prob-
ability of the empirical result, P(D\H), also known as
the p value, as the conditional probability of the hy-
pothesis, P(H\D); (b) the probabilistic nature of
NHST creates logical problems; and (c) NHST is mis-
leading in that it focuses on control of Type I errors
when the probability of such errors is zero.
Interpretation of p
The p value gives the probability that the observed
empirical result would have occurred given a certain
hypothetical distribution. We agree completely with
Cohen (1994), Gigerenzer (1993), Rozeboom (1960),
and others in their observation that many researchers
tend to misinterpret the p value as the probability of a
hypothesis given the data. However, this is the fault of
those who are doing the interpreting, not the tools that
they choose. Also, it is important to recognize that
there are many situations in which interpretation of a
small value of P(D\H0) as indicating a small value of
P(H0ID) can make sound, practical sense. To show
this, let us first examine Cohen's (1994) excellent
example from clinical/abnormal psychology. It goes
like this.
The base rate for schizophrenia in adults is roughly
2%. Suppose a given test will identify 95% of people
1 The term sampling error is used here to represent any
difference between statistics based on samples drawn from
the same population (cf. Hunter & Schmidt, 1990).
2 While no one argues with the previous sentence, the
present sentence may rankle for some. It seems to us, how-
ever, that a discussion of the probability of departure from
null implies that the null is taken to be true, and such a
discussion with such an implication is equivalent to a dis-
cussion of the probability of a result given the truth of the
null.
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with schizophrenia as being schizophrenic and will
identify 97% of "normal" individuals (in the clinical
sense) as normals. The data or empirical outcomes, in
this case, are the results of the test for schizophrenia.
The hypotheses correspond to the true nature of the
testee. So, /"(normal test resultlnormal testee) = .97,
while P (schizophrenic test resultlschizophrenic
testee) = .95. Stated formally, P(D0\H0) = .97 and
/>(D,IH,) = .95, while P(Dt\H0) = .03 and P(D0\H,)
= .05. We also have the prior probability or base rate
of occurrence for the null hypothesis, P(H0) = .98.
What we want to know, of course, is the probability
that a given person truly is schizophrenic in light of
the test result. Formally, we want P(HQ\Dt) or





Using this equation, Cohen (1994) showed that
P(H0\D,) = .607. Substantively, if the test says that a
person is schizophrenic, then the person will actually
turn out to be schizophrenic only 39% of the time. Of
the positive test results, 61% are wrong!
The point that we wish to make, however, is that
this result is problematic from only one perspective,
namely, that of the person who wants to find schizo-
phrenics. Consider another perspective: that of a per-
son in charge of hiring police officers. Such a person
would, in most cases, try to avoid hiring people whose
schizophrenia (or any other attribute) would be de-
bilitating with respect to job performance. In other
words, the employer's purpose is to make sure that a
given applicant is, in fact, normal in the clinical sense
of the word. The test from Cohen's (1994) example
identifies 95 of every 100 people as normal, of whom
94.9 really are normal. Therefore, the conditional ac-
curacy of a normal result from the test (i.e., P(H0IZ)0))
is 94.9/95, or .999! Only 1 out of every 1,000 people
with a normal result would actually suffer from
schizophrenia.
So, is this test useful to an employer? Without the
test, the employer would hire 20 people with schizo-
phrenia in every 1,000 hiring decisions. With the test,
the employer would get 1 person with schizophrenia
in every 1,000 hiring decisions. Thus, the odds of
hiring a person with schizophrenia without the test are
greater by a factor of 20! The point is that, not sur-
prisingly, the context largely determines the problems
caused by interpreting the results of NHST in a certain
way. Of course, we are only echoing statements made
almost 40 years ago. Rozeboom (1960) pointed out
that the probabilities associated with our hypotheses
are not the only considerations when deciding wheth-
er or not to accept or reject hypotheses. We must also
consider the "utilities of the various decision out-
comes" (Rozeboom, 1960, p. 423). For certain types
of decisions, a procedure that is prone to mistakes of
one kind can be devastating because of the utilities
associated with those mistakes, whereas a different
procedure that is prone to different kinds of mistakes
can be quite useful because the mistakes that it makes
result in "missing on the safe side."
Syllogistic Reasoning and
Probabilistic Statements
It has been suggested that the logic of NHST is, if
you will, illogical. Consider the issue as presented by
Cohen (1994), who set up various syllogisms repre-
senting different ways of viewing the logic of hypoth-
esis testing. Cohen (1994) pointed out that while the
rule of Modus Tollens can be universally applied to
premises of the form "If A then B, not B," resulting
in the conclusion "Not A," it cannot be universally
applied to the premises, "If A then probably B, not
B" to conclude "Probably not A." This sequence of
statements is meant as an analog for the statements
that are implicit in NHST. If the null were true, then
a sample taken from the population associated with
the null would probably produce a statistic within a
certain range (i.e., If A, then probably B). The statistic
from our sample is not within that range (i.e., not B).
Ergo, a population associated with the null value
probably did not produce our sample (i.e., probably
not A). Cohen then gave an intriguing example that
highlights one of the problems that can arise as a
result of applying the Modus Tollens to probabilistic
statements. The example is as follows:
If a person is an American, then that person is probably
not a member of Congress.
This person is a member of Congress, therefore,
This person is probably not an American.
In this case, the two premises are perfectly true, and
yet Modus Tollens fails to lead us to a reasonable
conclusion.
As we stated above, this example is intriguing, but
3 Conditional probabilities of other hypotheses can be
computed using similar equations.
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it is limited in its generalizability for two reasons. It is
important that these reasons be understood so that the
situations in which the logic of NHST is and is not
questionable can be identified. First, the consequent
of the first premise, "That person is probably not a
member of Congress," is true in and of itself. Any
given person is probably not a member of Congress.
As a result, one could use almost anything as the
antecedent of this premise without damaging the ac-
curacy of the premise.' 'If one out of every three cows
is blue, then this person is probably not a member of
Congress" is just as valid as the first premise from
Cohen's (1994) example. We explain the importance
of this feature of the example momentarily.
The second limiting aspect of the first premise is
that while the first premise is true as it stands, it is also
the case that being an American is a necessary con-
dition of being a member of Congress. In other words,
while it is true that "If a person is an American, then
that person is probably not a member of Congress," it
is also true if a person is a member of Congress, then
that person has to be an American. It is because of
these two aspects of the particular example chosen
that the Modus Tollens breaks down. Consider a dif-
ferent example, one that is more representative of psy-
chology:
If Sample A were from some specified population of
"normals," then Sample A probably would not be 50%
schizophrenic.
Sample A comprises 50% schizophrenic individuals;
therefore,
Sample A is probably not from the "normal" population
In this example, the consequent of the first premise
still stands by itself, that is, a given sample of people
probably will not comprise 50% people with schizo-
phrenia. However, this statement is particularly true if
the antecedent holds; whereas, in the Cohen example,
the consequent is particularly true if the antecedent
does not hold. To clarify this, consider a third ex-
ample:
If the planets revolve around the sun, then Sample A
probably would not be 50% schizophrenic.
Sample A comprises 50% schizophrenic individuals;
therefore
The planets probably do not revolve around the sun.
As with Cohen's example, the conclusion here is
false. Modus Tollens fails to lead to a reasonable con-
clusion because the truth of the antecedent of the first
premise is unrelated to the truth of its consequent. So,
while it is the case that Modus Tollens cannot be
applied to probabilistic premises when the truth of the
antecedent of the first premise is unrelated or nega-
tively related to the truth of the consequent of the
premise, it is approximately correct for and can be
applied to arguments, typical of psychology, in which
the truth of the two components of the first premise
are positively related. In other words, the typical ap-
proach to hypothesis testing does not violate the rel-
evant rule of syllogistic reasoning to any great degree.
Cohen's (1994) example was useful in that it showed
why application of Modus Tollens to probabilistic
statements can be problematic, but it should not be
taken to mean that this rule of syllogistic reasoning is
useless for psychology.
Interpretation of Error Rates
This brings us to the issue of interpretation of Type
I and Type II error rates, usually represented as a and
(i, respectively. There seems to be some confusion as
to the meaning of these values. For example, Schmidt
(1996) stated repeatedly that the Type I error rate, a,
is zero, as opposed to .05 or .01, or whatever the
predetermined cutoff value is. Cohen (1994) made
similar statements. Their reasoning is that because the
hypothesis of no effect is never precisely true, it is not
possible to falsely reject the null hypothesis (see
Frick, 1995, for an alternative position). In other
words, the null is always false, so rejecting the null
cannot be an error. This may be true, but it has noth-
ing to do with the Type I error rate.
The Type I error rate, a, is the probability that the
null would be rejected if the null were true. Note that
there is no suggestion here that the null is or is not
true. The subjunctive were is used instead of is to
denote the conditional nature of this probability. The
Type I error rate is the probability that the hypotheti-
cal null distribution would produce an observed value
with a certain extremeness. If this value is set at .05,
then in order for the observed test result to be con-
sidered statistically significant, it would have to be a
value so extreme that it (or a value more extreme)
would occur 5% of the time or less if we repeatedly
sampled from a null distribution. The .05 value is the
Type I error rate, regardless of whether or not the null
is true. Even if we know the null to be false, the Type
I error rate is still .05 because it has to do with a
hypothetical distribution, not the actual sampling dis-
tribution of the test statistic. Alpha is not the prob-
ability of making a Type I error. It is what the prob-
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ability of making a Type I error would be if the null
were true. One can, perhaps, argue that the term Type
I error rate is misleading. A better term might be
conditional Type I error rate. Regardless of the term
used, however, the value that we choose for a is the
Type I error rate regardless of the truth of the null.
This is not to say that the Type I error rate is the
only error rate on which we should focus or that this
error rate alone allows one to determine the impor-
tance of our empirical results. The Type II error rate,
which is also a conditional error rate, is at least as
important as the Type I error rate. Furthermore, as is
well known, for large sample sizes, the null can be
rejected regardless (almost) of the effect size and re-
gardless of the Type I error rate that is chosen. Thus,
the Type I error rate is only one of many consider-
ations in a test of significance. Nevertheless, it is im-
portant that the meaning of these values and their
conditional nature be understood so that further mis-
interpretation does not occur.
Another issue with respect to interpretation of error
rates has to do with the "null versus nil hypothesis"
distinction. As pointed out by Cohen (1994), the term
null hypothesis receives its name by virtue of the fact
that it is the hypothesis to be nullified. Thus, the value
associated with this hypothesis need not be zero. It
can be any value against which we wish to compare
the empirical result. The nil hypothesis, according to
Cohen (1994), would be a null hypothesis for which
the value to be nullified is precisely zero. The point
that Cohen (1994), Thompson (1992), and others have
tried to make is that because the nil hypothesis is
always false, there is no glory in rejecting it. It is a
"straw man" that is set up for the purpose of being
knocked down. Their point is well taken (although
Frick, 1995, and others have argued that there are
situations in which the nil can be precisely true), but
some authors have taken it further than it can go. For
example, Schmidt (1996) used the position that the nil
is always false to suggest that all research that has
compared a research hypothesis with the nil hypoth-
esis is worthless (except as fodder for meta-analyses).
While it is certainly true that the social sciences
should expand their methodological thinking to in-
clude null hypotheses other than the nil hypothesis, it
is not true that the use of the nil renders previous
research worthless. For example, suppose that there
are theoretical reasons for positing a positive relation-
ship between two variables. In an attempt to investi-
gate this relationship, data from 100 subjects are col-
lected, and the correlation is found to be .40. This
value can be converted into a t score (4.32), which is
greater than any cutoff value that is likely to be rel-
evant for our choices of test and significance level.
Thus, it is highly unlikely that this result would have
occurred if the nil hypothesis were true. We would,
therefore, proceed as if the nil were false and the
research hypothesis were true pending further infor-
mation (cf. Neyman & Pearson, 1928, 1933).
However, as pointed out by others, the nil is some-
thing of a straw man. It allows one to address the
question, "How likely is it that a population with a
correlation of zero would produce a given sample-
based correlation?" It would be more interesting to
ask whether or not it is likely that a population with a
trivial correlation would produce a given sample-
based correlation. While it is true that one person's
whopping effect is another person's trivium, let us
assume for the moment that any variable that explains
less than 1% of the variance in another variable ex-
plains only a trivial amount of variance. Instead of
using the nil hypothesis, we might use a null value of
.10 (which is the square root of .01). Thus, we would
compare our observed value of .40 with the null value
. 10 instead of the nil value. This test requires that we
convert both our observed correlation and our null
value to z scores with the Fisher r to z transformation,
which yields z values of 0.4236 and 0.1003. We then
compute a z value representing the difference between
these values. For the present example, this z value is
3.185, which is also greater than any cutoff value that
is likely to be relevant for our choices of test and
significance level. Thus, the outcome is the same for
this test as it was for the test involving the nil hypoth-
esis: We would proceed as if the research hypothesis
were true pending further information. This is not to
say that it makes no difference which value we choose
as the null value. Instead, the point that we wish to
make is that it is nonsensical to suggest that the use of
zero as the null value has produced nothing but worth-
less research. The point nil can be thought of as the
midpoint of some interval that (a) includes all values
that might be considered trivial and (b) is small
enough that calculations using the point nil give a
good approximation of calculations based on other
values within the interval. This interval is analogous
to the "good-enough belt" described by Serlin and
Lapsley (1985). Of course, the explicit use of such a
belt would be preferable to simply assuming that it
provides support for a given hypothesis. Nevertheless,
our point is that the conclusions drawn from the vast
majority of research that has focused on the nil would
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have been very much the same even if an alternative
null value had been used.
Additionally, while it may be the case that the nil
hypothesis is always false and that Type I errors with
respect to nil hypotheses never occur, the same can be
said of any hypothesis relating to a specific point in a
continuum (Frick, 1995). This fact does not allow one
to conclude that a point null hypothesis is a straw
man. Rejection of a given null hypothesis implies the
rejection not only of the particular null value in ques-
tion, but also of all of the values in the end of the
distribution that is opposite to the end in which the
observed value resides. For example, if an observed
correlation of .40 is compared with the null value of
zero, and NHST leads to the rejection of the hypoth-
esis p = 0, then it also leads to the rejection of the
hypotheses (p = -.01, p = -.02, p = -.10, and so
forth on to p = -1. If the null were instead p = .10,
then rejection of this hypothesis would also entail
rejection of hypotheses, relating to .09, .08, and so
forth, on to -1. Similar reasoning can be applied to
differences between means, or whatever the param-
eter of interest. Our point is that while the p value
specifically applies to a hypothetical distribution
based on the null value only, and while this distribu-
tion may never, in fact, exist, it cannot be claimed that
distributions relating to all values in the opposite di-
rection from the observed result do not exist. Since
these more extreme distributions would yield even
smaller p values, we are even more justified in reject-
ing hypotheses relating to the null values associated
with these distributions than we are in rejecting hy-
potheses relating to the null value of direct interest.
This argument is more easily understood in the con-
text of directional hypothesis tests.4 If a theory sug-
gests a negative correlation between two variables,
then one might use a significance test in which only
the negative end of the distribution is targeted. If the
relevant statistic falls within the rejection region, then
the hypothesis associated with the null value is re-
jected (tentatively). By implication, all of the distri-
butions associated with positive values are also re-
jected. Indeed, as Meehl (1967) pointed out, there is
no reason to suggest that all hypotheses associated
with a given half of a distribution are always false.
Thus, this significance test is not trivial. The theory
places certain constraints on the parameter of interest,
that is, positive or negative, and the significance test
allows the ruling out of the hypotheses associated
with the opposite direction.
The issue is more complicated for nondirectional
tests. Because such tests contain some rejection re-
gion in both tails of the distribution, it has been ar-
gued that an empirical result in one end of the distri-
bution does not imply rejection of all values in the
opposite end of the distribution. To shed some light
on this topic, let us first observe that nondirectional
tests occur in two contexts. In the first, the theory is so
weak that it cannot suggest a direction or pattern.
Thus, there is no reason to prefer one "direction"
over the other, and a nondirectional hypothesis is
tested. In the second context, the theory being tested
does suggest a particular pattern of relationships,
mean differences, and so on, but the analysis tech-
nique does not allow for precise consideration of these
patterns. It is this context to which our arguments
speak. For example, the null hypothesis in a one way
analysis of variance (ANOVA) has to do with equality
of group means. This null can be rejected if any form
of departure from equality occurs. Thus, an ANOVA
represents a nondirectional test, even if the theory in
question suggests a particular pattern. It is for this
reason that tests subsequent to the ANOVA are per-
formed. The NHST associated with the omnibus
ANOVA addresses only the issue of equality of
means. Thus, it represents a preliminary step in the
process of assessing the degree to which data and
theory are consistent with one another. The tests sub-
sequent to the ANOVA, which often also include
NHSTs, address the more specific questions concern-
ing the pattern of the results. Within the context of
these more specific tests, rejection of the null implies
rejection of all distributions that are at least as un-
likely as the null distribution.
Finally, it should be noted that even if Type I errors
for point null hypotheses were technically impossible,
it is entirely possible to commit errors that are similar,
if not identical to, Type I errors by concluding that
trivial departures from the null value justify the con-
clusion that the null hypothesis should be spurned and
the alternative hypothesis adopted. For example, con-
sider the relationship between extroversion and job
performance for sales representatives as reported by
Barrick and Mount (1991). The meta-analysis-based
correlation between these two variables uncorrected
4 Our purpose is not to endorse or recommend against
directional hypothesis tests (see Harris, \ 994, for a discus-
sion of the problems associated with one-tailed tests). We
mention one-tailed tests only to clarify our point with re-
spect to rejection of sets of hypotheses.
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for artifacts was .09. Given the sample size (2,316),
statistical significance, namely, H0: p = 0, was not an
issue. In other words, the nil hypothesis is rejected
ipso facto. However, a decision that is, for practical
purposes, a Type I error is still possible. If one con-
cludes from this empirical result that extroversion ex-
plains a meaningful amount of variance in job perfor-
mance in spite of the fact that less than 1% appears to
be explained, and if a correlation of .10 or less is
considered trivial, then this interpretation could easily
be construed as an error of some sort. In fact, the
authors did conclude that extroversion was a valid
predictor of job performance for sales representatives.
Thus, even in those cases in which a Type I error in
the strict sense is, for all intents and purposes, impos-
sible, it is possible to evaluate conclusions with re-
spect to Type I errors, vis a vis alternative null hy-
potheses.
What if Significance Tests Are Abandoned?
Various authors (e.g., Cohen, 1994; Schmidt, 1996)
have argued that NHST should be outlawed and re-
placed by parameter estimation procedures such as
confidence intervals (CIs).5 This argument, however,
becomes moot with a clear understanding of alpha.
Suppose, for example, that we wish to compare a
sample, with a mean of 1,180 and a standard error of
the mean of 8.17, to a population with a mean of
1,110. In a test of significance, alpha is the probability
that the population with the mean of the 1,110 would
have produced a sample with a mean of such a size
that we would reject the null hypothesis. If one dis-
cards tests of significance, alpha is effectively equal
to zero because no null hypothesis will ever be re-
jected.
The width of a CI is determined by 1 - a (multi-
plied by 100 to express it as a percentage). For the
example above, this alpha value would be the prob-
ability that a population with a mean of 1,180 would
produce a sample with a mean of a certain magnitude
(±;a * SE). In both cases, alpha partially determines
which values will fall into one class versus another.
For the significance test, alpha partially determines
which values are associated with a decision to con-
clude that the mean of the population from which the
sample came is different from 1,110. For the CI, alpha
partially determines which values represent means of
samples that are likely, or at least not unlikely, to have
been produced by a population with a mean of 1,180.
In using a confidence interval, we reject, implicitly or
explicitly, any hypotheses associated with values that
lie outside the interval. It should be noted that this is
true regardless of the way that the interval is de-
scribed. Even if one's focus is on the sampling error-
based band about a point parameter estimate (as op-
posed to focusing on the values that do not lie within
the band), the boundaries of this band are defined by
the values that lie outside it. The presentation of such
a band necessarily implies the exclusion of certain
values. Sometimes, this exclusion will be in error, and
the probability of such an error is called alpha.
Consider what happens if alpha is set to zero for
confidence intervals, as it would be for NHST if
NHST were abolished. An alpha value of zero sug-
gests a 100% CI, which would range from minus in-
finity to plus infinity (from -1 to 1 for correlations).
Such CIs, although perfect in the sense of always
being correct, are of no use. To make the CI useful in
any sense, we must accept an imperfect CI.
Historically, with the concept of probable error,
early statisticians used what were basically 50% CIs.
That practice was abandoned in favor of more con-
servative CIs for which failure of the interval to con-
tain the population parameter was considerably less
likely than 50%. Fundamentally, there is no way to
avoid making a decision regarding alpha, whether that
decision involves NHST or CIs. If we set alpha at zero
for NHST (refuse to do them), we should also do so
for CIs, which shows the underlying fallacy of the
replacement of NHST with CIs. As with significance
tests, there is a probability of being wrong when form-
ing a CI, and that probability is called alpha.
Likewise, if tests of significance are abolished,
power, the probability of rejecting the null hypothesis
when it is false, is zero. Power, like CIs, depends on
alpha; without alpha, beta is 100% and power is 1 - p.
Thus, power equals zero. When these points are added
to the fact that CIs and significance tests are based on
precisely the same information (i.e., parameter esti-
mates and standard error values), the only reasonable
conclusion is that CIs and power estimation cannot be
done instead of tests of significance but that instead
they should be done in conjunction with significance
tests.
5 There are many statistics—such as goodness-of-fit in-
dices, tests of normality, and tests of randomness—for
which confidence intervals are not available (Nantrella,
1972).
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Discussion
In conclusion, we would like to reiterate our agree-
ment with many of the positions taken by the authors
listed in the first paragraph of this article. Significance
testing is abused. Application of Modus Tollens and
other rules of syllogistic reasoning to probabilistic
statements can lead to problems. Interpretation of p
values as the probability of the truth of the null hy-
pothesis given the data is inappropriate. CIs and
power should be reported. The points that we wish to
make here are these. First, the purpose of data analysis
is to allow us to examine the extent to which the data
provide corroboration for the theory-based answer to
the research question. This corroboration typically
comes in the form of discontinuation of alternative
hypotheses and explanations (Popper, 1959). NHST
gives us an objective mechanism by which we can
rule out hypotheses and explanations relating to the
null. Second, the arguments against the use of NHST
are built on faulty premises, misleading examples, and
misunderstanding of certain critical concepts. We at-
tempt to show that there are many cases in which
drawing conclusions about hypotheses based onp val-
ues is perfectly reasonable. Indeed, a probabilistic
version of the Modus Tollens rule of syllogistic rea-
soning can be applied to many examples typical of
psychology to produce approximate probabilistic
statements about hypotheses. Furthermore, a firm un-
derstanding of the nature of error rates gives insight
into the fact that p values are useful regardless of the
actual state of reality. Finally, the position that NHST
should be replaced by CIs is nonsensical. The two are
based on exactly the same information, and both in-
volve an exclusionary decision of some kind. To criti-
cize and revile one while advocating the other is nei-
ther consistent nor rational.
Future of Data Analysis
This is not to say that NHST is appropriate for
every situation. It is not. But neither are the alterna-
tives appropriate for every situation, and neither are
they to be applied without judgment. Various sugges-
tions have been made with respect to methods that are
deemed superior to NHST such as CIs, effect size
estimations, and meta-analysis. Each of these methods
certainly has its advantages, but they are no less prone
to abuse than any other method, and none of them is
appropriate for every situation. For example, meta-
analysis is not useful for many research questions that
have not been addressed empirically in previous stud-
ies, and like NHST, it has assumptions that should be
considered when interpreting results. Effect size esti-
mation must also be approached with caution, as an
effect size estimate is typically the amount of variance
in one variable accounted for by another in the sample
at hand. The problem is that effect size estimates are
dependent on the variabilities of the particular mea-
sures and experimental manipulations used in the
sample (Cortina and DeShon, 1997; Dooling and
Danks, 1975), therefore, the use of different manipu-
lations or measures may result in different effect size
estimates. Effect size estimates are helpful but must
be interpreted with caution.
Finally, many have recommended CIs as a replace-
ment for NHST. However, confidence intervals and
NHST calculations are based on precisely the same
information. For example, a 95% CI about the differ-
ence between two means and a significance test at .05
both use the difference between sample means, the
value from the t distribution corresponding to the de-
grees of freedom involved, the sample variances, and
the sample sizes. The two methods simply present this
information in different ways. The result is an empha-
sis on parameter estimation versus an emphasis on
sampling error, with each emphasis having its advan-
tages and disadvantages.
Also, there is no reason to believe that the use of
CIs instead of significance tests will change anything.
We are all familiar with studies in which CIs are
reported, and these studies often point out whether or
not the interval includes zero. That is a significance
test. It has been argued that this is an inappropriate
application of CIs and should be done away with
(Schmidt, 1996), thus leaving only the parameter es-
timate and the width of the band around it. Unfortu-
nately, no alternatives are offered for objectively de-
termining the extent to which the data corroborate the
theoretical predictions of the study. Moreover, many
of those who would replace significance tests with CIs
see no need for alternatives because they believe that
no conclusions can be drawn from the single sample
study (Schmidt, 1996). For those of us who believe
that there is unique merit in the single sample study,
the lack of criteria for determining the agreement be-
tween theory and data is profoundly disturbing. This
lack leaves a yawning gap in the system used to evalu-
ate the merit of most manuscripts submitted for pub-
lication.
In any case, the sorts of problems that occur with
NHST, CIs, and other statistical procedures are not
inherent in these procedures but instead stem from
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ignorance of proper applications of these techniques.
By replacing NHST with CIs, we actually do harm by
giving the illusion that the problems are solved when,
in fact, they have not even been addressed.
It is also worth noting that problems associated
with the identification of appropriate decision criteria
are likely to persist simply because of the types of
questions that we ask. In the behavioral sciences, we
have traditionally asked yes-no questions, Does A
affect B? Does goal setting affect performance? Rea-
son and previous work give us prior bases for expect-
ing certain answers to these questions. If significance
tests contribute support for these expectations, then
we have attacked the problem, and received corrobo-
ration, from both the theoretical and empirical sides.
Unfortunately, our theories are rarely precise enough
to allow for predictions of parameter values. Thus,
only empirical support for a given parameter value is
possible. On the other hand, if we keep our questions
more general, more conservative, then the possibility
of having both theoretical and empirical support ex-
ists. As always, we must apply the same care and
thought to the interpretation of empirical evidence
that we apply to theoretical evidence.
Finally, let us not forget that judgment is required
in every analysis of scientific information. The abuses
of NHST have come about largely because of a lack
of judgment or education with respect to those using
the procedure. The cure lies in improving education
and, consequently, judgment, not in abolishing the
method. Mindless application of any procedure causes
problems, and discarding a procedure because it has
been misapplied ensures the proverbial loss of both
baby and bathwater.
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